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Keep Your Program Out of My Game: The Ninth 
Circuit’s Convoluted Copyright Analysis in MDY 
Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
World of Warcraft (“WoW”), a popular online game, boasts over 
twelve million users1 and generates more than $1.5 billion annually.2 
Blizzard Entertainment, the company that runs WoW, claims in its 
end user license agreement (“EULA”) to grant purchasers “a 
limited, non-exclusive license” to install and use the game subject to 
numerous restrictions.3 Besides retaining the ability to terminate the 
license agreement at will, Blizzard also requires users to agree that 
any violation of the restrictions on the license agreement constitutes 
“an infringement of Blizzard’s copyrights in and to the Game.”4 
Under U.S. copyright law, the penalty for copyright infringement 
can be steep: statutory damages of up to $150,000 for willful 
infringements, or actual damages if they can be proved.5 
With so much risk for so many users, it is critical that courts craft 
copyright law to account for the realities of the marketplace and the 
protection of consumers. Additionally, courts should be sensitive to 
the interests of others trying to lawfully create products that 
integrate into other digitally based products, such as online games, 
especially when those integrations do not harm demand for the 
original product. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit has taken a 
different approach in MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard 
Entertainment, Inc.6 In that case, the court provided only 
 
 1. Press Release, Blizzard Entm’t, World of Warcraft Subscriber Base Reaches 12 
Million Worldwide (Oct. 7, 2010), available at http://us.blizzard.com/en-
us/company/press/pressreleases.html?id=2847881. 
 2. MDY Indus., Inc. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (D. Ariz. 
2009), vacated, 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010), amended by 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3428 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
 3. World of Warcraft End User License Agreement, BLIZZARD ENTM’T, 
http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_eula.html (last updated Oct. 29, 2010). 
 4. Id. 
 5. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006). 
 6. 629 F.3d at 935. In the order amending the court’s original opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit denied a rehearing and added a footnote to clarify that the court did not decide 
whether a statutory provision, DMCA § 1201(f), applied because the argument was not raised 
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incomplete protection for consumers and severely punished MDY 
Industries for providing a product to consumers that arguably added 
value to WoW without detracting from its demand.  
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in MDY is 
erroneous for several reasons. First, the court followed an 
ownership/licensing distinction for software that undermines the 
“first sale” doctrine, is strongly in favor of copyright holders, and 
conflicts with consumer perceptions. Second, the court applied a 
misguided test to determine whether violating a license provision 
constitutes copyright infringement based on a distinction between 
covenants and conditions. Third, the court needlessly created a 
circuit split to hold MDY liable under the DMCA anti-
circumvention provisions where MDY was not liable for copyright 
infringement.  
Part II provides the facts and procedural history of MDY. Part 
III summarizes the three main holdings of the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision. Part IV analyzes each of the court’s holdings, 
demonstrating the errors in the court’s logic and policy judgments. 
Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Blizzard Entertainment is the creator of the massively multiplayer 
online role-playing game (“MMORPG”), World of Warcraft. In this 
game, “players control their ‘avatar’ characters within a virtual 
universe, exploring the landscape, fighting monsters, performing 
quests, building skills, and interacting with other players and 
computer-generated characters.”7 As characters perform these tasks, 
they gain experience and advance levels.8 In March 2005, Michael 
Donnelly, owner of MDY Industries, developed a software program 
that would automatically simulate play for some of the lower levels of 
WoW.9 Donnelly originally designed his software, known as Glider, 
for personal use, but later began selling the program to other WoW 
users through MDY’s website.10 
 
to the district court or presented in the parties’ appellate briefs. 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3428, 
at *27 n.19. All other aspects of the court’s original opinion remained unchanged by the 
amending order. 
 7. MDY, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 962. 
 8. Id. 
 9. MDY, 629 F.3d at 935.  
 10. Id. at 935–36. 
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However, to play WoW, Blizzard requires that a player read and 
accept two separate agreements.11 When installing the game client on 
a computer and first running WoW, the user must agree to Blizzard’s 
EULA.12 When connecting to Blizzard’s online service to play the 
game, the user must accept Blizzard’s Terms of Use (“ToU”).13 At 
the time that Donnelly began marketing Glider, he reviewed both 
documents and concluded that bots (software, such as Glider, that 
automates game play) were not prohibited.14 However, later that 
year, Blizzard launched a technology known as Warden, which was 
“developed to prevent [] players who use unauthorized third-party 
software, including bots, from connecting to WoW’s servers.”15 At 
the time of its launch, Warden was capable of detecting Glider, and 
Blizzard used the technology to ban most Glider users.16 In 
response, MDY modified Glider to be more difficult for Warden to 
detect and continued to market the product to WoW users.17 MDY 
also “modified its website to indicate that using Glider violated 
Blizzard’s ToU.”18  
Following Glider’s modifications, Blizzard responded to MDY 
with a cease-and-desist letter, alleging that players’ use of Glider 
infringed Blizzard’s copyrights.19 When MDY refused to remove 
Glider from its site, Blizzard threatened suit while MDY commenced 
legal action “seeking a declaration that Glider does not infringe 
Blizzard’s copyright or other rights.”20 Blizzard asserted 
counterclaims for “contributory and vicarious copyright 
infringement, violation of DMCA [Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act] §§ 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1), and tortious interference with 
 
 11. Id. at 935. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 936. Blizzard’s EULA and ToU were subsequently changed to make clear 
that “cheats, automation software (bots), hacks, mods or any other unauthorized third-party 
software designed to modify the World of Warcraft experience” are prohibited. World of 
Warcraft End User License Agreement, supra note 3; World of Warcraft Terms of Use, 
BLIZZARD ENTM’T, http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html (last 
updated Dec. 9, 2010).  
 15. MDY, 629 F.3d at 936. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 936–37. 
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contract.”21 DMCA § 1201(a)(2) provides penalties for providing a 
product that circumvents technology that controls access to a 
copyrighted work.22 Similarly, § 1201(b)(1) prohibits providing a 
product that circumvents technology designed to protect the rights 
of a copyright owner.23 
The district court granted partial summary judgment to Blizzard, 
finding that MDY was liable for contributory and vicarious copyright 
infringement, as well as tortious interference with Blizzard’s 
contracts.24 The district court granted MDY partial summary 
judgment only on the issue of whether MDY violated DMCA § 
1201(a)(2) by accessing WoW’s source code.25 Following a bench 
trial, the district court ultimately found MDY liable for violating 
Section 1201(a)(2), because it circumvented Blizzard’s Warden 
 
 21. Id. at 937. 
 22. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2006). The full text of the statute provides: 
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise 
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, 
that—  
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this 
title; 
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to 
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title; or 
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with 
that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title. 
Id. 
 23. Id. § 1201(b)(1). The full text of the statute provides: 
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise 
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, 
that— 
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection 
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright 
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; 
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to 
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a 
right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; or 
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with 
that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a 
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under 
this title in a work or a portion thereof. 
Id. 
 24. MDY, 629 F.3d at 937. 
 25. Id. 
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technology, and liable for violating Section 1201(b)(1).26 
Consequently, the court held Donnelly personally liable for $6.5 
million in damages.27 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed on the issues of 
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement and liability under 
DMCA § 1201(b)(1).28  However, MDY was still found to be liable 
under DMCA § 1201(a)(2).29 The court did not decide the issue of 
tortious interference, but vacated the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment because there were issues of material fact that 
needed to be considered.30  
The court began its analysis by first considering the copyright 
infringement claims.31 MDY stipulated that if WoW users violated 
Blizzard’s copyright by installing and using Glider, MDY would be 
liable for contributory and vicarious infringement.32 As part of its 
analysis, the court first determined whether WoW players owned the 
game or merely licensed it from Blizzard.33 Based on a recent test 
that the Ninth Circuit used in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.,34 the court in 
MDY concluded that WoW players are licensees rather than 
owners.35 Because of this, WoW users were not eligible for the 
“essential step” defense that could protect their use of the game.36 
After determining that Glider users were licensees, the court 
examined whether violating the license agreement constituted 
copyright infringement. 
 
 26. Id. at 937, 943. 
 27. Id. at 937. 
 28. Id. at 958. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. at 937. 
 32. Id. at 938. 
 33. Id. 
 34. 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] software user is a licensee rather than 
an owner of a copy where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; 
(2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use 
restrictions.”). The problematic nature of this test is taken up in Part IV.A. 
 35. MDY, 629 F.3d at 938. 
 36. Id. at 939. By contrast, if WoW players were owners of the software, they would not 
be liable for copyright infringement where they made the copy as an “essential step” in using 
the software (i.e., copying the software into a computer’s RAM before playing the game). Id. 
at 938. 
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Under Ninth Circuit precedent, a licensee who acts outside of 
the license agreement may be liable for copyright infringement.37 To 
ascertain this, the Ninth Circuit applied Delaware law38 to determine 
whether the term in the EULA and ToU that prohibited bots was a 
“condition” of the license agreement or a “covenant.”39 While the 
two seem indistinguishable on their face, the ultimate effects of 
either classification are vastly different. Breaching a condition of a 
license agreement constitutes copyright infringement, with its 
accompanying statutory damages, while violating a covenant of a 
license results in an action for breach of contract, in which recovery 
is limited to actual damages.40  
To distinguish the two provisions in a license agreement, the 
Ninth Circuit defined a covenant as “a contractual promise, i.e., a 
manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a particular 
way, such that the promisee is justified in understanding that the 
promisor has made a commitment.”41 On the other hand, a 
condition falls under a narrower class that encompasses “an act or 
event that must occur before a duty to perform a promise arises.”42 
Stated another way, a breach of a license agreement results in liability 
for copyright infringement where “(1) the copying [] exceed[s] the 
scope of the defendant’s license and (2) the copyright owner’s 
complaint [is] grounded in an exclusive right of copyright.”43 
Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit determined that Blizzard’s 
prohibition on bots was a covenant and, consequently, Glider users 
did not infringe Blizzard’s copyrights.44 Based on this holding, the 
Ninth Circuit also held that MDY was not liable to Blizzard for 
contributory or vicarious infringement.45 
After addressing the copyright infringement claims, the court 
addressed Blizzard’s claims under the DMCA regarding MDY’s 
 
 37. See id. at 939. 
 38. Delaware law was applied here because Blizzard’s EULA and ToU “provide that 
they are to be interpreted according to Delaware law.” Id. 
 39. Id. at 939–40. 
 40. Id. at 941 n.3. 
 41. Id. at 939. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 940. 
 44. Id. at 941. 
 45. Id. at 941–42. The court’s misguided application of the condition/covenant 
distinction is addressed in Part IV.B.  
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circumvention of Blizzard’s Warden technology.46 The court noted 
that the purposes of the DMCA are to protect copyright owners and 
“mitigate the problems presented by copyright enforcement in the 
digital age.”47 As mentioned above, DMCA §§ 1201(a)(2) and 
(b)(1) prohibit trafficking in technology that circumvents 
technological protections.48 Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits bypassing a 
technological measure that controls access to a copyrighted work 
while Section 1201(b)(1) prevents bypassing protection that a 
technological measure provides to rights of a copyright owner.49 
While at first glance the textual differences between these two 
sections appear small, the court relied heavily on these small 
differences. The court used these differences as the basis for some 
legal gymnastics to conclude that Section 1201(a)(2) focuses on 
access to a copyrighted work, which is not a traditional right 
protected by copyright law, while Section 1201(b)(1) addresses 
traditional copyright protections for “reproduction, distribution, 
public performance, public display, and creation of derivative 
works.”50  
In arriving at these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
Federal Circuit precedent by deciding that a violation of Section 
1201(a)(2) did not require that the circumventing device actually 
facilitate copyright infringement.51 Based on the court’s 
interpretation of these DMCA provisions, it held that MDY did not 
violate Section 1201(b)(1), but that it was liable under Section 
1201(a)(2).52 The end result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision was to 
reverse MDY’s liability for copyright infringement, but paradoxically, 
to hold MDY liable for violating the DMCA anti-circumvention 
statute when no copyright infringement had occurred. 
 
 46. MDY, 629 F.3d at 942. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006). For the full text of these statutes, see supra 
notes 22, 23. 
 50. MDY, 629 F.3d at 944. 
 51. Id. at 950. 
 52. Id. at 954–55. The dangerous precedent and purposeful circuit split created by the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the DMCA is addressed in Part IV.C. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in MDY illustrates that it favors the 
interests of copyright holders over those of software users and 
developers. Each main holding in the case has this bias and 
undermines one of the key purposes of copyright law: to balance 
copyright protections while not deterring “artistic creation for the 
betterment of society.”53 This Part analyzes each of those holdings 
and discusses where the Ninth Circuit went wrong. 
A. Purchasing Physical Media Without Owning It 
One of the key issues in MDY was whether players of WoW 
actually owned copies of the game, or whether they were only using 
them under a license from Blizzard. In this case, the outcome of that 
issue determined whether the “essential step” defense could be 
invoked by users who ran Glider, and consequently whether they 
could be classified as copyright infringers.54 
Prior to MDY, the Ninth Circuit held in Mai Systems Corp. v. 
Peak Computer, Inc. that running a program by copying it into a 
computer’s RAM constituted making a copy of the program for 
purposes of copyright infringement.55 Congress had previously 
responded to concerns that anybody using a computer could be 
considered a copyright infringer by creating the “essential step” 
exception, which generally allows an owner of copyrighted work to 
make a copy of that work where doing so is an “essential step” in 
using the product.56 However, in Mai the Ninth Circuit nonetheless 
held that computer repair persons were liable for copyright 
infringement when they turned on a computer because the computer 
created a copy of the operating system as it was loaded into RAM 
and the repair persons were not the owners of the copyrighted 
material.57 After the Ninth Circuit’s debacle, however, Congress was 
 
 53. See Kelly Cochran, Facing the Music: Remixing Copyright Law in the Digital Age, 20 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 312, 320 (2011). 
 54. MDY, 629 F.3d at 938. 
 55. 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 56. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006); see also Bill Hinsee, Wrath of the EULA: Can the Use 
of Bots Lead to Copyright Infringement?, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 160, 163 (2011). 
 57. See Mai, 991 F.2d at 517–19. 
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more explicit and specifically exempted computer repair people from 
copyright infringement when repairing a computer.58  
Although the “essential step” exception resolved some of the 
confusion over making copies to run a program, the exception still 
generally applies only to “owners.” In this case, because the users 
physically purchased a CD to run WoW, it could have been simple 
for the Ninth Circuit to declare that the users owned the individual 
copies of the CD and its software. However, the Ninth Circuit 
instead chose to continue to apply bad principles by using its 
controversial test articulated in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.59 
In Vernor, the Ninth Circuit held “that a software user is a 
licensee rather than an owner of a copy where the copyright owner 
(1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly 
restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes 
notable use restrictions.”60 The Vernor test is so easy to meet that it 
severely weakened the value of the “first sale” doctrine, which 
generally precludes liability for copyright infringement for resale of a 
copy of a work where the person actually owns that copy.61 After 
Vernor, virtually every person who purchases a copy of software no 
longer owns that software, but is a licensee instead. The Vernor test 
has thus been justly criticized as “drastically shift[ing] the rights of 
downstream consumers back to copyright holders, severely damaging 
a century’s worth of rights balancing which promotes restraints on 
alienation and the demise of secondary media markets.”62 In MDY, 
the Ninth Circuit could have overturned or limited Vernor without 
causing much difficulty because it had not been around long enough 
to garner substantial reliance. However, by upholding Vernor, the 
court once again affirmed its new course toward protecting copyright 
 
 58. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c). 
 59. 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching 
and Concerning Copyright: Real Property Reasoning in MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard 
Entertainment, Inc., 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1063, 1078–79 (2011) (“To reach [its] 
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit followed its own controversial logic from Vernor v. Autodesk, in 
effect allowing the copyright holder to impose, via EULAs and ToUs, servitudes that restrain 
the otherwise permissible, ‘ordinary’ behavior of users in lawful possession of copies of 
copyrighted works.”). 
 60. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111. 
 61. Marcelo Halpern, Yury Kapgan & Kathy Yu, Vernor v. Autodesk: Software and the 
First Sale Doctrine Under Copyright Law, 23 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 7, 7 (2011). 
 62. David A. Costa, Vernor v. Autodesk: An Erosion of First Sale Rights, 38 RUTGERS L. 
REC. 213, 213 (2010). 
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holders at the expense of software purchasers and traditional 
copyright doctrines. 
Another problem with the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between 
licensing and ownership is that it does not reflect market 
perceptions. “[C]onsumers naturally feel that purchasing a given 
product should confer ownership and allow for freedom in that 
product’s disposition.”63 Many WoW users would likely be surprised 
to hear that the CD that they purchased at the store is actually the 
property of Blizzard Entertainment. While consumer desires and 
perceptions should not dictate the law, they do show how far distant 
the Ninth Circuit’s view of copyright is from reflecting the realities 
of marketplace perceptions. 
B. Covenants, Conditions, and Confusion 
The Ninth Circuit in MDY claimed to follow precedent when it 
determined that violating the license agreement was a breach of 
contract rather than copyright infringement.64 The court applied a 
test based on a distinction between covenants and conditions, where 
a breach of a condition of a license agreement constituted copyright 
infringement while a breach of a covenant limited liability to breach 
of contract damages. However, in applying this test, the court 
improperly stretched precedent to fit a particular policy result, which 
ended up creating an unworkable and unpredictable test for future 
cases.  
One commentator has pointed out that the major distinction 
between breach of contract and copyright law is that copyright law is 
ultimately an enforcement of property rights.65 To make copyright 
infringement depend on violation of a condition rather than a 
covenant does not make sense because property rights are already 
defined by copyright law and are unchanged by a license, which 
merely defines authorization and access to certain property rights. 
Viewing the Ninth Circuit’s covenants/conditions test in this light 
illustrates that all the test accomplishes is that it determines whether 
someone committed copyright infringement by reference to whether 
 
 63. Michael V. Sardina, Exhaustion and First Sale in Intellectual Property, 51 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1055, 1056 (2011). 
 64. MDY Indus., Inc. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2010), 
amended by 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3428 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 65. Raymond T. Nimmer, Copyright First Sale and the Over-Riding Role of Contract, 51 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1311, 1311 (2011). 
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they actually violated the copyright (and lacked authorization to do 
so). By creating such a simplistic test and packaging it in terms of 
whether licensing provisions are covenants or conditions, the Ninth 
Circuit has injected unnecessary confusion and complexity into 
copyright law. 
Another commentator, Dennis Karjala, has strongly criticized the 
Ninth Circuit’s covenant/condition distinction.66 He argues that 
such an approach is “incompatible with true licenses that are 
negotiated between knowledgeable parties, which often condition 
the continuation of the license on compliance with promises that 
have nothing to do with the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner.”67  
Karjala raises two good points that warrant further elaboration. 
First, giving software licensing agreements with consumers the same 
force as a true licensing agreement—one between sophisticated 
merchants—does not make sense. Boilerplate, one-size-fits-all 
agreements are generally one-sided, and while enforceable under 
ProCD,68 courts should treat them with caution, knowing that the 
consumer is already the vulnerable party. Further, consumers are 
extremely unlikely to have read software licensing agreements. While 
this is not an excuse to avoid enforcing all license agreements, this 
general trend ought to give courts some hesitation when trying to 
split hairs between whether a term is a condition or covenant.  
Second, if conditions truly warrant treating software licensing 
agreements as “true licenses” (or if courts are determined to take 
that position), then there is no reason to make any distinction 
between covenants and conditions at all. If parties are being treated 
as knowingly agreeing to the terms of the license, those terms should 
govern in their entirety. For example, Blizzard’s EULA states that 
“[a]ny use of the Game in violation of the License Limitations will 
be regarded as an infringement of Blizzard’s copyrights in and to the 
Game.”69 While it seems illogical to hold inexperienced consumers 
absolutely to such licensing agreements, if courts are to treat 
consumers as knowledgeable licensees then they ought to be willing 
to fully support freedom of contract by enforcing any violation of the 
 
 66. Dennis S. Karjala, Protecting Innovation in Computer Software, Biotechnology, and 
Nanotechnology, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 42, 61 n.93 (2011). 
 67. Id. 
 68. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 69. World of Warcraft End User License Agreement, supra note 3. 
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licensing agreement as a copyright violation. Rather than taking 
either this position or recognizing the problems with enforcing 
licensing agreements against consumers, the Ninth Circuit in MDY 
has perpetuated a legal fiction with its current test. This legal fiction 
undermines the freedom to contract, creates uncertainty, and only 
offers meager protection to consumers who are unlikely to be aware 
of licensing terms or to understand which terms are linked with 
copyright infringement. 
C. DMCA Anti-Circumvention Liability Without Copyright 
Infringement 
Perhaps the most damaging precedent that the Ninth Circuit 
created in MDY was to hold MDY liable under the DMCA anti-
circumvention provisions even though it was not liable for copyright 
infringement. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to hold MDY liable under these 
provisions contradicts the superior approach taken by other courts.70 
Those courts “hold that only circumvention that supports copyright 
infringement is prohibited.”71 For example, in Chamberlain Inc. v. 
Skylink Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit was presented with a 
case where a garage door opener manufacturer had installed a 
“rolling code” program for its transmitters that would regularly 
change the code needed to open the garage door.72 Skylink, a 
manufacturer of universal transmitters, bypassed the “rolling code” 
to allow its transmitters to work with Chamberlain’s garage door 
openers.73 Chamberlain sued Skylink, alleging violations of the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA.74 To prevent a possible 
DMCA interpretation that would “grant manufacturers broad 
exemptions from both the antitrust laws and the doctrine of 
copyright misuse,” the Federal Circuit declared that the DMCA anti-
circumvention provisions “do not establish a new property right” 
 
 70. Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2010: Copyright and Trade Secret Cases, 9 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 325, 332 (2011). 
 71. Id. (citing MGE UPS Sys. v. GE Consumer & Indus. Inc., 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 
2010); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004)). 
 72. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1185. 
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and “simply provide property owners with new ways to secure their 
property.”75 Consistent with this approach, the court held that the 
DMCA provisions “prohibit[] only forms of access that bear a 
reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act 
otherwise affords copyright owners.”76 
The position taken by the Federal Circuit appears to be the most 
logical approach to applying these DMCA provisions. It prevents 
abuse of copyright law by limiting the scope of DMCA liability so 
that copyright holders are not equipped with weapons that extend 
beyond the protections that traditional copyright law affords, while 
retaining those traditional protections. The Ninth Circuit reached a 
result that has potential for abuse by overzealous copyright holders 
who can now threaten or sue others under the DMCA, even though 
there is no copyright violation.77 And rather than ignoring Federal 
Circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the better 
approach offered in Chamberlain on this issue, creating an 
unnecessary circuit split.78 
Another problem with the Ninth Circuit’s DMCA analysis is that 
it is inconsistent with the underlying purposes of the DMCA and 
copyright law. The court recognized that the DMCA exists to 
“conform United States copyright law to its obligations under two 
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) treaties, which 
require contracting parties to provide effective legal remedies against 
the circumvention of protective technological measures used by 
copyright owners.”79 However, the court failed to take account of 
the broader purposes of copyright law, which have been summarized 
by scholars as protecting authors’ ownership of their works alongside 
 
 75. Id. at 1192–94. 
 76. Id. at 1201. 
 77. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to adopt an “infringement nexus” 
requirement for DMCA violations while it required “that for a licensee’s violation of a contract 
to constitute copyright infringement, there must be a nexus between the condition and the 
licensor’s exclusive rights of copyright.” MDY Indus., Inc. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 
928, 941, 950 (9th Cir. 2010), amended by 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3428 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(emphasis added). 
 78. Id. at 950 (“While we appreciate the policy considerations expressed by the Federal 
Circuit in Chamberlain, we are unable to follow its approach.”). But see Raymond Nimmer, 
Ninth Circuit Rejects Chamberlain, Places DMCA Back on a Proper Track, 16 CYBERSPACE L. 
21, 21 (2011) (“The Ninth Circuit, in MDY . . . expressly rejects Chamberlain, returning the 
statute to its intended purpose—creating a right to protect controls on access to works in 
digital contexts.”). 
 79. MDY, 629 F.3d at 942. 
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encouraging “artistic creation for the betterment of society”80 or 
“provid[ing] just enough incentive to prompt the creation of new 
works.”81 These purposes would justify allowing noninfringing 
innovative products, such as Glider, particularly where such products 
do not harm demand for the original product.82 By ignoring the 
larger context of copyright law, the Ninth Circuit reached the 
untenable conclusion that MDY was liable for circumventing Warden 
even though MDY and all other Glider users were not liable for 
copyright infringement. Instead of furthering the purposes and 
consistency of copyright law, the Ninth Circuit created an 
unnecessary circuit split, adopted bad policy, and added new 
protections for copyright holders at the expense of innovation and 
artistic creation.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In MDY, the Ninth Circuit sent a strong and clear message from 
Blizzard and other game owners to future software developers: 
“Keep your program out of my game.” At the expense of innovation 
and clarity in copyright law, the court reaffirmed the controversial 
Vernor test delineating whether a software purchaser is an owner or a 
licensee. Further, the court inconsistently applied an already 
confusing standard for copyright infringement involving conditions 
and covenants. In addition, it created a new circuit split in order to 
protect a previously nonexistent right of copyright holders to enforce 
the DMCA anti-circumvention provision against software developers 
that do not even engage in copyright infringement. 
The Ninth Circuit’s slant in favor of copyright holders at the 
expense of software purchasers and innovative software developers is 
evident throughout MDY. If the Ninth Circuit continues on its 
misguided path through copyright law, Congress or the Supreme 




 80. Cochran, supra note 53, at 320. 
 81. Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 
905 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 82. The parties in MDY disputed whether Glider harmed Blizzard’s revenues, and the 
court did not decide the issue. MDY, 629 F.3d at 939. It is entirely possible that Glider 
increased Blizzard’s revenues. 
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between copyright holders, software purchasers, and innovative 
developers. 
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